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Abstract 
This article contributes to an understanding of how conditionality applies across social 
security and immigration policies in restricting the access to social benefits of national 
citizens, EU and non-EU citizens. Specifically, the article builds on Clasen and Clegg’s (2007) 
framework of conditionality in the context of welfare state reform by extending that 
conceptual framework to include migration. The framework is applied to examine how 
different levels of conditionality have been implemented in UK policy reforms to restrict 
access to rights of residence and to social benefits. It is argued that a conditionality 
approach moves beyond a binary of citizens and migrants in social policy analysis, 
contributing to an understanding of the dynamics and interactions of work-related 
conditions in restricting access to social benefits, with implications for inequalities that cut 
across national, EU and non-EU citizens in terms of the relationship of particular groups to 
the market.  
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Introduction  
Debates about welfare states and migration are often framed by questions regarding the 
relative exclusion of migrants from the social rights of citizenship, including access to social 
benefits. Those debates have tended to centre on a binary distinction between citizens and 
migrants, with citizens constructed as a benchmark of inclusion against which the social 
rights of migrants are measured. Migrants may be identified as foreign nationals – as 'non-
citizens' of the country to which they have migrated (for further discussion see Anderson 
and Blinder, 2014). However, citizens and non-citizens are not unitary groups regarding their 
access to social rights. As feminist scholarship has underlined, citizenship can exclude from 
‘within’ as well as from ‘without’ (Lister, 2003). Policies towards both citizens and non-
citizens have increasingly restricted access to the rights of citizenship or residence within a 
nation-state, including entitlement to social benefits, on the basis of paid work/economic 
independence.  
 
As regards the social rights of citizens, access to social benefits has been subject to 
increasing conditionality, underpinned by a market model of citizenship that assumes 
individual responsibility to participate in paid work and self-provisioning through work 
(Bennett and Millar, 2009; Dwyer, 2004). Within this context, work-related conditions, 
requiring benefits claimants to look for, prepare for and take up available work, have been 
extended in terms of the groups to which they apply, the type of conditions imposed, and 
the stringency of the conditions, including the withdrawal of benefits as a penalty for non-
compliance (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
 
2 
 
At the same time, conditionality has also been implemented to restrict the entry, residence 
and access to social benefits of non-citizens. Different conditions apply to the citizenship 
and immigration status of particular groups, resulting in differentiated modes of inclusion 
and exclusion (Carmel et al., 2011; Sainsbury, 2012). While EU countries have facilitated the 
migration of workers from within and outside the EU, access to social benefits has been 
claimed to be a pull factor for 'unwanted' migration (Geddes, 2003) – despite the lack of 
evidence to support those claims (Corrigan, 2010; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). In light of 
this, proposals for restrictions on EU citizens' access to social benefits have been put 
forward by member states with higher levels of EU migrants, including the UK, Germany, 
and the Netherlands (Ruhs, 2015). Indeed, the UK has made those restrictions central to its 
2015/16 negotiations on the UK's continued membership of the EU.  
While inequalities between citizens and migrants in access to social benefits are evident in 
terms of entitlements to those benefits and, relatedly, benefits receipt (Morrissens and 
Sainsbury, 2005), there has been limited analysis of the ways in which conditionality 
restricts access. This article contributes to an understanding of how work-related conditions 
implemented through policy reforms restrict access to rights of residence and entitlement 
to social benefits across national, EU and non-EU citizens. It thus contributes more broadly 
to an understanding of the implications of conditionality for potentially extending 
inequalities among as well as between national, EU and non-EU citizens in terms of the 
relationship of particular groups to the market. It is argued that a conditionality approach 
moves beyond a binary of citizens and migrants by allowing for analysis of the dynamics and 
interactions of different types of conditions in restricting access to rights of 
citizenship/residence and to social benefits, while pointing to the ways in which a model of 
conditional rights premised on work/economic independence has exclusionary implications 
for all.  
 
The article is structured as follows. The first section considers the ways in which work-
related conditionality has been implemented in restricting citizens' access to social benefits, 
drawing on Clasen and Clegg's framework for analysing different levels of conditionality 
relating to welfare reform (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). Section two develops and extends that 
conceptual framework to include policy reform in relation to migration. The framework is 
then applied in sections three and four to empirically examine how those levels of 
conditionality have been implemented through policy changes in the UK, and how they 
interconnect in restricting EU and non-EU migrants' access to rights of residence and 
entitlement to social benefits. The analysis focuses on access to means-tested working-age 
social benefits (benefits paid to those in work and those out of work). It examines policy 
change in the UK over time, with a focus on recent reforms since 2010 under the 
Coalition/Conservative governments with respect to non-EU and EU migrant workers. 
Analysis of the UK policy context allows for a focus on a country where both EU and non-EU 
migrant workers have constituted a significant share of migration inflows. EU and non-EU 
nationals accounted for 48 and 52 per cent of non-British inflows in 2014, respectively. 
Among EU inflows, two thirds came for work-related reasons, while among non-EU inflows, 
a quarter came for work-related reasons, other mains reasons being for study or family 
(Vargas-Silva and Markaki, 2015). Within the EU, the UK also has the highest number of 
citizens from the EU accession member states and, after Germany, the highest numbers of 
EU and non-EU citizens overall (Eurostat). Reference to EU migrants in the UK refers to 
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those who have rights as EU citizens under EU law1. Reference to non-EU migrant workers in 
the UK refers to those who are subject to UK immigration law2. The final section addresses 
the implications of work-related conditionality for inequalities among, as well as between, 
national, EU and non-EU citizens.  
 
Work-related conditionality and access to social benefits 
With the restructuring of welfare states and the pursuit of labour market activation policies, 
citizens' access to social benefits has become increasingly conditional upon participation in 
activities which support entering or re-entering paid work (Aurich, 2011; Dwyer, 2004). 
While access to social benefits has for long entailed some form of conditionality, the 
economic crisis of 2008, it is argued, critically undermined the principle that the market 
could be relied upon to provide adequate incomes for all – for the subjects of labour market 
activation policies (Marchal et al., 2014). Income from employment – the main source of 
household income – fell in real terms in some OECD countries (including Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK, the USA) in the period 2007-2009, while income from self-employment fell 
across most OECD countries (Jenkins et al., 2013). While there were nominal and real 
increases in levels of minimum income benefits in some European countries in the period 
2008-2010, notably the conditions attached to claiming those benefits were not relaxed, 
and in some countries intensified (Marchal et al., 2014).  
  
Clasen and Clegg (2007) define the different ‘levels of conditionality’ that have been 
implemented through policy changes across countries and within a country over time. Those 
levels of conditionality have acted as a ‘lever’ for making access to social benefits more or 
less restrictive (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). The first level of conditionality concerns ‘conditions 
of category’. Membership of a defined category of benefits support is, as they note, socially 
constructed: certain groups can be included or excluded according to changing definitions of 
a particular category. Changes in guidance to welfare professionals on a particular category 
(e.g. who is eligible for unemployment benefit) can thus be a lever for restricting access to 
social benefits (e.g. excluding students). The second level of conditionality concerns 
‘conditions of circumstance’, which involve eligibility criteria applied to a particular benefit, 
such as work-based criteria for contributory benefits and need-based criteria for non-
contributory benefits, both of which can be a lever for determining and restricting access to 
social benefits. The third level concerns ‘conditions of conduct’, which apply after eligibility 
for a social benefit has been determined. This level of conditionality has been the focus of 
more recent welfare reforms, involving the obligation of benefits claimants to engage in 
work-related activities as a condition of their ongoing entitlement – the emphasis being on 
the work-related behaviour of the claimant as a condition of access.  
 
In the UK, all three levels of conditionality are evident, and to some extent interconnect, 
when considering the ways in which work-related conditionality has intensified in terms of 
the social groups to which it applies and the stringency of the conditions. Welfare reforms 
have extended work-related conditions to groups claiming social benefits that would 
previously have been exempt from those conditions. With respect to conditions of category, 
lone parents with children aged five and over have now been included within the category 
of ‘job-seekers’ (the 2015 Welfare Reform and Work Bill proposes extending full work-
related requirements when a child is aged 3). Similar restrictions apply in some other 
European countries (Knijn et al., 2007). Likewise, people with disabilities are now subject to 
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a work capability assessment to determine the category of benefits to which they are 
entitled (Patrick, 2011). By moving certain groups into different benefits categories, with 
work-based eligibility criteria attached to particular benefits, those groups have been 
required to comply with work-related conditions of conduct. At the same time, there has 
been an increase in the use of sanctions for failure to comply with conditions of conduct, 
such as failure to apply for a job, removing the benefits of a claimant for specific periods of 
time (Watts et al., 2014). 
 
With the introduction of the Universal Credit system3, work-related conditions of 
circumstance and conduct are to be extended further, applying not only to benefits 
claimants who are not in work but to those in work. In-work claimants will be subject to a 
‘conditionality threshold’ regarding their weekly earnings (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Those 
whose earnings fall below the threshold (equivalent to 35 hours at the national minimum 
wage) will be required to undergo activities to increase their earnings by increasing their 
hours of work and/or increasing their wages (Universal Credit Policy Briefing No.12, 2011). 
Work-related conditionality in the context of social security policy in the UK has thus sought 
to increase reliance on the market through a focus on individual work-related behaviour, 
requiring not simply participation in paid work but a particular number of hours of 
work/level of earnings. While cuts to expenditure on working-age social benefits (in work 
and out-of-work benefits), and a cap on total household benefits payments, have also been 
implemented since the 2008 crisis, which have restricted the level and coverage of benefits 
(Hood and Phillips, 2015), the expansion and increasing severity of conditions of conduct 
has likewise resulted in restriction 'from within' – the exclusion of national citizens from 
access to benefits.  
 
Migration and conditionality 
Migrants' access to social rights, including entitlements to social benefits, has been 
fundamentally shaped by the immigration policy of nation-states, in addition to their 
welfare system (Sainsbury, 2012). Immigration and naturalisation policies determine who is 
granted entry to a country; the conditions of admission to a country, including access to the 
labour market and to social provisions; and the conditions for acquiring permanent 
residence or citizenship within a country (Baubock, 1994). In this section, Clasen and Clegg’s 
framework of conditionality (2007) is extended to include policy reforms relating to 
migration. Clasen and Clegg's framework focuses on the levels of conditionality that apply to 
all with respect to social benefits claims. The following analysis takes as its starting point 
how these levels of conditionality apply in determining who has rights of 
residence/citizenship to make those claims. It thus establishes a continuum of the three 
levels of conditionality across immigration, citizenship and social security policies, which can 
be applied to make access to rights of residence and to social benefits more or less 
restrictive. 
Conditions of category 
In the context of immigration policy, conditions of category can be distinguished as the 
categorisation of certain groups entering a nation-state as subject to immigration controls, 
and the categorisation of those groups according to immigration status e.g. as workers, 
students, family members or asylum seekers. Those categories, like categories of social 
benefits support, reflect changing definitions, which can include or exclude particular 
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groups. As regards the category of 'worker', since the late 1990s the immigration policies of 
OECD countries have increasingly differentiated between categories of migrant workers 
according to their assumed economic value , facilitating the admission of those whose 
labour is assessed as being of high-value, while restricting the entry of low-skilled workers 
(Beine et al., 2015; Ruhs, 2013; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). Immigration policies have also 
aimed to facilitate admission on the basis of wealth, establishing entry routes specifically for 
investors (OECD, 2015).  
 
As regards migration from within the EU, the development of European citizenship has 
granted EU citizens rights to free movement across the EU, irrespective of economic status 
(Article 21(1), TFEU; Article 45, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). However, work-related 
conditions of category apply with respect to which EU citizens have rights of residence in 
another member state (Directive 2004/38/EC). Extended rights of residence, beyond three 
months of entry, are conferred on those who are defined as workers, self-employed, 
jobseekers, or self-sufficient (including students), and their family members – self-sufficient 
being defined as those who “have sufficient resources for themselves not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State” (Article 7, 1(b), Directive 
2004/38/EC). While the definition of a 'worker', which rests on EU case law, is a broad 
definition, based on paid employment (Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg 
[1986] ECR 2121) and activities which are "genuine and effective" (Case 53/81 Levin v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035), in addition to excluding those engaged in 
unpaid work/care, how a worker is defined in practice may potentially be more or less 
restrictive. 
 
Conditions of circumstance 
Conditions of circumstance concern the eligibility criteria for: i) entry and temporary 
residence in a country (e.g. as a worker); ii) entitlement to claim social benefits; and iii) 
acquisition of permanent residence or citizenship. Those conditions can further restrict who 
has rights of residence, and under what terms and conditions.  
 
First, the work-based criteria for the admission and temporary residence of non-EU migrant 
workers can be more or less restrictive. Since the 2008 economic crisis, which has had 
varying effects on international migration (Tilly, 2011), some European countries have 
implemented measures to make the admission of high-skilled non-EU workers less 
restrictive in seeking to attract workers for particular occupations (e.g. Germany), while 
others have introduced more restrictive measures, including requirements of employers to 
demonstrate proof of earnings of those admitted as high-skilled workers (e.g. the 
Netherlands and the UK) (OECD, 2015).  
 
Second, the residence-based criteria for determining entitlement to claim social benefits on 
the basis of residence can be more or less restrictive. In some countries, such as Sweden, 
access to social benefits is granted to non-EU migrants on the basis of one year of legal 
residence, be it temporary or permanent (European Migration Network, 2013). In others, 
such as Germany and the Netherlands, non-EU migrants who have temporary residence are 
also, in principle, entitled to some social benefits. However, claiming those benefits can be 
used as grounds for non-renewal of residence status and for refusing applications for 
permanent residence, the eligibility criteria for permanent residence in effect restricting 
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access to social benefits (Morris, 2001; Müller et al., 2014). In other countries, such as the 
UK, permanent residence is required of most non-EU migrants to claim social benefits, the 
conditions of access to permanent residence thus being a lever for restricting access to 
those provisions.  
 
While EU migrants residing in another member state are entitled to claim social benefits 
(Article 34(2), EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), residence-based criteria may also 
potentially restrict access. Access to non-contributory social benefits on the basis of place of 
'habitual residence'  involve a broad range of criteria for determining place of habitual 
residence (Article 11, Regulation 987/2009/EC), which may be more or less restrictive. At 
the same time, the criteria for determining if an EU migrant has rights of residence in 
another member state under EU law, e.g. as a 'worker', may be more or less restrictive.  
 
Third, a range of criteria may apply in determining eligibility for permanent residence or 
citizenship in a country (International Organization for Migration, 2009). While 
developments at the EU level have sought to harmonise the rights of non-EU citizens to 
permanent residence – requiring member states to grant permanent residence after five 
years of continuous legal residence (Directive 2003/109/EC) – work-related conditions of 
circumstance restrict who has access to those rights. Non-EU citizens must demonstrate 
economic independence by having stable and regular resources, sufficient to live “without 
recourse to the social assistance system of the member state concerned" (Article 5, 1(a), 
Directive 2003/109/EC). With respect to the UK (the focus of the following section), these 
provisions do not apply – indeed, the UK has taken a highly selective approach to 
participating in EU immigration and asylum policy (Costello and Hancox, 2014). Access to 
permanent residence in the UK has been marked by a tightening of both work-related 
conditions of category and circumstance, as the following section examines.  
 
Conditions of conduct 
Conditions of category and circumstance may indirectly require migrants to adhere to 
conditions of conduct – to certain types of behaviour, activity and relationships – in order to 
enter, reside, access social benefits, permanent residence or citizenship in a country. 
Migrant workers whose visa is tied to their employer are dependent on maintaining a 
relationship with that employer for their residence status (Anderson, 2010). Where workers 
are in principle entitled to change employer, they may still decide to stay with an employer 
and accept particular working conditions in order to meet the required duration of legal 
residence to apply for permanent residency (Shutes, 2012). Likewise, where economic 
independence is a condition of eligibility for permanent residence, migrants may be 
reluctant to claim social benefits even if they are, in principle, entitled to do so. Analysis of 
the ‘civic integration' programme in the Netherland, in which non-EU migrants are required 
to participate as part of the process of applying for permanent residence, highlights the 
ways in which self-sufficient behaviour is emphasised through the programme as an implicit 
condition for inclusion in Dutch society (Suvarierol, 2015). 
 
While in principle EU citizens automatically have a right to permanent residence after five 
years of continuous legal residence in another member state (Article 16, Directive 
2004/38/EC), access to permanent residence requires the EU citizen to have been able to 
reside over that period as a worker, self-employed or self-sufficient person (or their family 
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member). Thus, work-related conditions of conduct – e.g. staying in work – as opposed to 
simply duration of residence, may in effect restrict access to permanent residence.  
 
Non-EU migrants, residence and access to social benefits in the UK 
This section examines how these different levels of conditionality have been implemented 
through policy changes in the UK in restricting the entry, residence and access to social 
benefits of non-EU migrant workers. While those changes have, over time, made access to 
social benefits for most non-EU migrants in the UK exclusive to those granted permanent 
residence, the analysis highlights the ways in which recent reforms, with respect to non-EU 
migrant workers, have served to further tighten the conditions determining which workers 
have access to rights of permanent residence.  
 
Conditions of category have increasingly restricted entry to the UK. Under the 1948 British 
Nationality Act, Commonwealth citizens (from the former colonies) were still granted 
broadly the same rights as citizens of the UK and the colonies in the post-war period of 
migration to the UK (Spencer, 2011). The 1971 Immigration Act introduced restrictions on 
the rights of entry of Commonwealth citizens, re-categorising migrants from these countries 
as subject to immigration controls. From the late 1990s, immigration policy selectively 
opened up the entry of migrant workers from outside the EU on the basis of their perceived 
contribution to the economy (Morris, 2007). With the aim of competing for skilled non-EU 
migrant workers, the points-based immigration system was introduced in 2008, increasingly 
differentiating between categories of non-EU migrant workers on the basis of skill/income 
(Home Office, 2006; Spencer, 2011). Following the introduction of the system, the category 
for the potential entry of low-skilled workers (Tier 3) was suspended. At present, only ‘high 
value migrants’ (Tier 1), including investors and entrepreneurs, and ‘skilled workers’ (Tier 2) 
are among the categories permitted entry, while the introduction of quotas within those 
categories in 2011 placed further limits on the entry of high-skilled workers (Home Office, 
2015).  
As regards entitlement to social benefits in the UK, conditions of category and circumstance 
have both been a lever for restricting access. The national provisions of the post-war 
welfare state, including the introduction of National Assistance, were not exclusive to 
citizens of the UK. The provision of non-contributory supplementary benefit was, under the 
1966 Social Security Act, made available to anyone in the UK, irrespective of nationality or 
length of residence, subject to the same eligibility criteria (Feldman, 2003). However, access 
to social benefits became increasingly restricted, first, through the categorisation of 
Commonwealth citizens as subject to immigration controls under the 1971 Immigration Act 
(Solomos, 2003), and second, by making ‘no recourse to public funds’ (no entitlement to 
non-contributory social benefits) a condition of entry for those subject to immigration 
controls (Sainsbury, 2012). At the same time, in the case of asylum seekers, who remained 
entitled to some means-tested social benefits, legislative changes in the 1990s increasingly 
restricted access by making asylum seekers ineligible for mainstream benefits, introducing a 
separate system of asylum support, with reduced and more restrictive types of provision 
(Sales, 2002).  
As non-EU migrants subject to immigration controls generally have ‘no recourse to public 
funds’ (unless granted humanitarian protection), access to permanent residence or 
8 
 
citizenship has been the basis for acquiring entitlements to social benefits in the UK. Data on 
grants of settlement (permanent residence) in the UK indicate an upward trend over the 
past twenty years, with permanent residence on the basis of work (applications from non-
EU workers and their dependants) becoming the most frequent category since 2008, 
representing 48 per cent of grants of settlement in 2012 compared with 17 per cent in 1997 
(Blinder, 2014). Over that period, immigration reforms have restricted access to permanent 
residence by extending the required duration of legal residence in the UK to be eligible to 
apply. In addition, since 2010, different levels of conditionality have been implemented to 
further restrict access to permanent residence for those not deemed to be of 'high value' to 
the economy.  
 
First, in terms of conditions of category, the range of workers that have an entitlement to 
apply for permanent residence has been reduced. Only those who are categorised as ‘high-
value’ (Tier 1, including entrepreneurs) and ‘skilled’ (Tier 2) are entitled to apply for 
permanent residence after five years in the UK. Domestic workers are among those who 
have been excluded from access to permanent residence (Home Office, 2012). Second, 
regarding conditions of circumstance, the eligibility criteria for permanent residence have 
become more restrictive in relation to work, with the aim of “breaking the link between 
work and settlement, so that only those who contribute the most economically will be able 
to stay long-term” (Prime Minister David Cameron, 25 March 2013). A ‘genuine 
entrepreneur test’ has been extended to assess the eligibility of entrepreneurs (under Tier 
1) to apply for permanent residence (HC 1025, 26 February 2015). A minimum salary 
threshold will also be introduced in 2016, requiring non-EU skilled workers (under Tier 2) to 
have a minimum salary of £35,000 to be eligible to apply (HC 1039, 14 March 2013). This is a 
higher level of pay than the salary required for temporary admission to the UK as a non-EU 
skilled worker (£20,300), and a higher level of pay than the median gross annual earnings of 
all (full-time) workers in the UK (£27,200 in 2014) (Office for National Statistics, 2014).  
 
Work-related conditions of circumstance have also been tightened for the admission of non-
EU family members, requiring the applicant to have a minimum gross annual income of 
£18,600 for a non-EU spouse/partner to join them, and an additional amount for children 
(HC 194, 13 June 2012). Based on the earnings of a sample of applicants, it was estimated 
that just under half would have failed to meet the new income criteria (Migration Advisory 
Committee, 2011). Among non-EU workers and non-EU family members, these levels of 
conditionality have thus restricted access to rights of residence, and entitlement to social 
benefits, to those who are least likely, in terms of their status in the market, to be in need of 
those provisions. A wider set of immigration policy changes (Immigration Act 2014; 
Immigration Bill 2015-16) have, more broadly, extended migration controls from within the 
UK.  
 
EU migrants, residence and access to social benefits in the UK 
While EU citizens, in principle, have rights to enter, reside and claim social benefits in the UK 
and other European countries on the basis of EU citizenship, different levels of conditionality 
have been implemented in the UK as a means of restriction ‘from within’: restricting EU 
migrants' access to rights of residence and social benefits.  
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Following EU enlargement, the UK was among those countries that did not impose 
transitional restrictions on the entry of A8 workers. Those who registered as ‘workers’ were 
entitled to reside, with full access to in-work benefits and child benefit, while access to out-
of-work benefits required one year of continuous employment in the UK. Since EU 
enlargement, and particularly since the lifting of transitional restrictions on the migration of 
A8 nationals (in 2011) and A2 Bulgarian and Romanian nationals (in 2014), work-related 
conditions of category and circumstance have increasingly been applied in the UK to restrict 
EU citizens’ access to social benefits.  
 
In 2004 a 'right to reside' test was introduced, which requires EU migrants to demonstrate 
that they have a legal right to reside in the UK under EU law – as a worker/self-employed 
person or jobseeker (or their family member) – in order to be eligible to claim social benefits 
(SI 2006/1003; SI 2006/1026)4. The test is in addition to the ‘habitual residence’ 
requirements, which apply to all individuals who have come/returned to the UK (within the 
last two years), including UK citizens (SI 2014/902). With the lifting of transitional 
restrictions on A2 nationals in 2014, the conditions of circumstance for determining habitual 
residence and a 'right to reside' in social benefits claims have become increasingly 
restrictive. In addition to a minimum of three months residence (SI 2013/3196), a minimum 
earnings threshold has been introduced in guidance on assessing if an EU citizen is a 
worker/self-employed (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015; HM Revenue and 
Customs, 2014). This requires those out of work (who retain worker status, under EU law, if 
they are made involuntarily unemployed) to have been earning for the past three months at 
the level at which National Insurance contributions are paid (£153 a week in 2014-15, 
equivalent to working 24 hours a week at the national minimum wage). Those who do not 
meet this earnings threshold are subject to an assessment as to whether their work can be 
considered ‘genuine and effective’ under EU law (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015; 
HM Revenue and Customs, 2014; see O'Brien, 2015, on the extent to which these measures 
are compatible with EU law).  
 
Work-related conditions of circumstance have also been a lever for restricting access to 
social benefits for EU migrants with rights of residence as ‘jobseekers’ under EU law. 
Following legislative changes in 2014, those claiming income-based Jobseekers Allowance 
are subject to a ‘genuine prospect of work test’ after three months,  losing their benefits 
entitlement unless they can provide “compelling evidence” that they are continuing to seek 
employment and have “a genuine chance of being engaged” (Memo DMG 2/15; SI 
2013/3032, Regulation 6)5. Guidance on what constitutes ‘compelling evidence’ of finding 
work, requires stricter work-related conditions of conduct than those that apply to UK 
citizens claiming benefits as jobseekers, requiring either an offer of a job that is ‘genuine 
and effective work’ and due to start in three months (in which case benefits entitlement can 
be extended until the job commences), or a change of circumstances, such as re-location, 
that has resulted in job interviews (in which case entitlement may be extended for up to 
two months) (Memo DMG 2/15). With the introduction of the Universal Credit system, more 
restrictive conditions of category will be introduced, as a result of which ‘jobseekers’ will be 
excluded from entitlement to claim Universal Credit (SI 2015/546).  
 
There are no data on the proportion of benefits claims of EU nationals refused on the basis 
of failing the right to reside test, but there have been a number of cases in the UK and 
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European Courts concerning EU citizens residing in the UK, including those who have been 
working in the UK, whose benefits claims have been refused on grounds that they do not 
have a ‘right to reside’ as a worker or jobseeker (see Widmann, 2013). The case of St Prix vs 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions illustrates the dynamics and interactions of these 
levels of conditionality in shaping the access to social benefits of EU migrants. Jessy St Prix, a 
French citizen, had her claim for means-tested Income Support in the UK refused on the 
basis that she was not defined as a ‘worker’. She had previously worked as a teaching 
assistant while studying for a teaching qualification in the UK, during which time she 
became pregnant. She subsequently took up agency work, working in nurseries, but stopped 
this work as it was too demanding in the latter stages of her pregnancy. Her claim for 
Income Support after her baby was born was refused on the basis that she did not have a 
‘right to reside’ in the UK as she was not a ‘worker’ (she was considered to have voluntarily 
stopped working, therefore not retaining the status of worker) (2012 UKSC 49).  
 
Conditions of category (being defined as a worker with a right to reside) and work-related 
conditions of circumstance (not leaving a job ‘voluntarily’, thereby losing the status of 
worker) interconnect in terms of the exclusion of St Prix from access to social benefits in the 
UK. The refusal of her claim was challenged and eventually the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ruled in favour of St Prix in 2014 regarding the interpretation of the status 
of worker, ruling that "a woman who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the 
physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the aftermath of childbirth retains 
the status of ‘worker’ […] provided she returns to work or finds another job within a 
reasonable period after the birth of her child" (C-507/12). While the ruling recognised the 
rights of EU citizens to retain their status as ‘worker’ during (gendered) periods of time not 
in paid work due to childbirth, work-related conditions of conduct are imposed in order to 
retain this status. Returning to work or taking up another job within a ‘reasonable period’ is 
defined in relation to national legislation on the duration of maternity leave (paragraph 42, 
C-507/12). This period of leave is likewise defined as a maximum of 12 months without 
affecting the five years of residence in a member state that is a requirement for permanent 
residence (paragraph 45, C-507/12). The EU migrant whose ‘right to reside’ depends on 
being a worker is thus obligated to return to work or become a jobseeker (within a year of 
childbirth according to UK statutory maternity leave) in order to access social benefits. As a 
jobseeker, if she fails to demonstrate a ‘genuine prospect of work’ after three months, 
through a job offer, she potentially loses her entitlement to social benefits. Moreover, she 
risks losing an entitlement to permanent residence in the long term by not re-entering work 
within this period.  
 
Discussion and conclusion: implications of work-related conditionality 
Different levels of conditionality apply across social security, immigration and citizenship 
policies in making access to rights of residence and entitlement to social benefits more or 
less restrictive. A conditionality approach enables a less static picture of rights on the basis 
of citizenship and immigration status, allowing for analysis of the dynamics and interactions 
of those different levels in restricting access to social rights across different groups. A focus 
on those dynamics thus moves beyond a binary of citizens and migrants in social policy 
analysis, pointing to the implications of a model of conditional rights premised on 
work/economic independence for potentially increasing inequalities among as well as 
between those groups.  
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In the context of UK policy reforms, work-related conditions have restricted access to social 
benefits across national, EU and non-EU citizens, with a dual purpose to control migration 
and reduce welfare expenditure. Conditions of category – being defined as an EU 'worker' or 
a non-EU 'skilled worker' – interconnect with increasingly restrictive conditions of 
circumstance to make not simply work but work with a minimum level of earnings a 
condition for access to rights of residence/permanent residence as an EU or non-EU worker. 
These levels of conditionality have implicitly imposed work-related conditions of conduct on 
the EU and non-EU citizen in order to access rights of residence as workers. The non-EU 
skilled worker must acquire a salary of £35,000 to be able to apply for permanent residence. 
The EU worker must provide evidence that they have a minimum level of earnings or have 
been in ‘genuine and effective work’ to be recognised as a worker with a right to reside and 
claim social benefits. At the same time, those claiming social benefits (both citizens and 
non-citizens), are subject to increasingly restrictive conditions of conduct that make not 
simply work but a minimum level of earnings an individual responsibility .  
 
Work-related conditionality, in restricting access to rights of residence and entitlement to 
social benefits, has implications for differentiated economic and social outcomes among 
migrant groups, defined not simply by their status as EU or non-EU citizens but by their 
(gendered) labour, income and wealth. Restricted access to social benefits has generated 
forms of ‘categorical inequality’ as regards not only whether migrants (and which groups of 
migrants) can participate in the labour market, and under what conditions, but the extent to 
which they must be entirely dependent on their labour (McGovern, 2012), and thus at 
greater risk of poverty. Indeed, differences in levels of poverty between national citizens, EU 
and non-EU citizens are found to be greatest in European countries that have implemented 
more restrictive conditions on access to permanent residence for non-EU citizens – with 
higher levels of poverty among non-EU migrants in those countries (Corrigan, 2014). At the 
same time, for those who are able to access rights of residence and claim social benefits, the 
withdrawal of benefits for failure to comply with work-related conditions has put particular 
groups at greater risk of poverty. Benefits claimants who have been subject to sanctions are 
among the most disadvantaged groups in relation to the labour market (Griggs and Evans, 
2010).  
 
Conditionality in immigration and social security policies also has implications for the 
distribution of the costs of meeting welfare needs. In the USA, welfare reforms that 
restricted the entitlement of permanent residents to federal programmes of social 
assistance for the first five years of permanent legal residence were associated with 
increasing levels of poverty among permanent residents (Broder and Blazer, 2011). Many 
state authorities, however, used local state-funded provision to support those made 
ineligible for federally-funded assistance, though cuts at the local level placed those 
provisions at risk (Broder and Blazer, 2011). In the UK, restricting access to social benefits 
for non-EU and EU migrants has also shifted the costs of meeting welfare needs to the local 
level, with non-EU migrants who have ‘no recourse to public funds’ as well as EU migrants 
denied a ‘right to reside’ dependent on limited local provisions and informal support (Price 
and Spencer, 2015). At the same time, the use of sanctions, withdrawing the benefits of 
claimants for failure to comply with work-related conditions, has made those who are, in 
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principle, entitled to national state-funded provisions dependent on sources of informal 
support, including food banks (Perry et al., 2014).    
 
Public debate on welfare in the UK has been marked by myths about 'us and them': "We are 
always in work, pay our taxes and get nothing from the state. They are a welfare-dependent 
underclass, pay nothing to the taxman, and get everything from the state" (Hills, 2014: 1). 
While the latter quote refers to myths in relation to citizens – to divisions between the 
'hard-working' vs the 'benefit-scrounging' citizen – it could equally apply to myths in relation 
to citizens vs migrants (e.g see Cook et al., 2012). Levels of public expenditure on working-
age social benefits, and on whom (7.2 per cent of claimants were estimated to be non-UK 
citizens in 2015) (DWP, 2015), need to be framed in terms of the much wider role of welfare 
states in addressing the dynamics of welfare needs across population groups, during periods 
in and out of work over the life course (see Hills, 2014). Restricting access to social benefits, 
for those in low-paid work and those not in work, both through cuts and increasing 
conditionality, through social security and immigration policy, disproportionately affects 
more disadvantaged groups among citizens and non-citizens in terms of their relationship to 
the market, while it potentially risks undermining the role of welfare provisions in relation 
to both social and economic goals.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Including citizens of the European Economic Area.  
2 Non-EU citizens have rights to free movement under EU law if they are the family members of EU 
citizens, in addition to protections under immigration and asylum policy developments. The UK has 
opted out of various measures on the rights of non-EU citizens (see Costello and Hancox, 2014). 
Reference to non-EU citizens/migrants in this article does not include non-EU migrants who are 
reliant on EU law, unless otherwise specified.  
3 The Universal Credit system replaces various working-age benefits and tax credits with a single 
benefit and assessment process (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010). 
4 The ‘right to reside test’ applies to means-tested benefits (Income Support, income-based 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, 
Pension Credit, Council Tax Reduction, Universal Credit, Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit). The 
European Commission concluded that the right to reside test in the UK is discriminatory against EU 
citizens from other member states (as it does not apply to UK citizens) and referred the UK to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in June 2014 (the case is ongoing). 
5 EU citizens with a right to reside as a ‘jobseeker’ are also no longer entitled to claim Housing 
Benefit (SI 2014/539). 
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